Materials and manufacturing processes for increased life/reliability by Duttweiler, R. E.
m,
MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
FOR INCREASED LIFE/RELIABILITY
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During the early 60's, improvements in both quality and durability of disk raw
material were considered necessary for both military and commercial engines.
Vacuum melting technology proved to be the breakthrough that spawned a new series
: of "superallo_-s", but it offered many process challenges. These new, tougher to
forge alloys were developed to run at stress levels 50% above then existing com-
rner,:ial disk experience and simultaneously meet greatly increased l_w cycle fatigue :
life capabilities. After addressing to the low probability of being able to rely on +
- Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) to sort for "good" part_ - including the then emer- i
ging improved ultrasonic techniques - General l_lectr!c set an objective to provide
material free of harmful indications for engine parts. +
The challenge was met by introducing an entirely new concept in raw material process
control which was defined as Premium Quality (I_) material. It imposes careful
selection, screening and sampling of the basic alloy ingredients, followed by careful
monitoring of the melting parameters in all phase8 of the Vacuum Melting (VIM/VAR)
sequenc'e. Special care is taken to preclude solidification conditions that produce
adverse levels of segregation. Melt furnaces are routinely cleaned and inspected for
contamination. Ingots are also cleaned and inspected before entering the final melt
step.
The ingot to billet conversion steps are closely controlled and monitored to maintain
melt traceability and ingot position. Special Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE)
/ routines are applied to the final billet. Questionable indications are cut out for
"' / metallurgical evaluation. Disposition of such a billet depends on the nature,
frequency and distribution of the indication. Occasionally an entire ingot, or even
the entire heat, is rejected.
Billets that meet standards are then sent to the forging house where those to be used
fur rotating disks undergo further NDE. Those passing thLs Stage are cut into
forging multiples - each multiple producing one part - and the end faces of each
/ multiple are etched as a final check for segregation before forging begins. When
unacceptable Indlcatinns are observed, correlation is made to the location of the
affected billet In the Ingot, and If not found to meet certain criteria, the entire
, Ingot product is again subject to rejection.
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Forging and heat treat operations are performed to very detailed practices with
tight controls on forging pre-heat and reduction sc':_dules, as well as the quench
rates from solution heat-treatment. Metallurgical control is maintained over
morphology, grain size and mecbanical properties. Once accepted as Premium
Ouality material, the disks are shipped to the shop and skim-cut to a configuration
suitable for immersion ultrasonic inspection. A three-mode scan is performed
with Numerically Controlled (NC) eqt,.ipment capable of finding randomly oriented
indications in the part. Rejections are less than one part in one thousand for sig-
nificant ultrasonic indications, and few of these have proven to be actual flaws.
These processing and inspection actions on the part of the supplier and manufacturer
provide reasonable assurance thathigh qualityparts are delivered. As a result,
General Electric CF6 engines have not experienced a materials related failureof a
/an, compressor or turbine disk where the prescribed controls have been followed.
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PREV.EB.T..L_ OF ROTOR FAILURES IS A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF
THE ENGINE HANUFACTURER,
I_LT_FJ_IAL.P_BOCESSCONTROL IS THE MOST IMPORTANT KEY ELEMENT
IN THE PREVENTION OF HATERIAL DEFECT RELATED FAILURES,
THE HIGH BYPASS TURBOFAN ENGINE PRESENTED lOONY
NEW CHALLENGES TO ROTOR MATERIALS INTEGRITY NEEDSI .
- ._ INCREASE IN MECHANICAL PROPERTY LEVELS
- MORE MASSIVE COMPONENTS
- HAINTAIN DESIGN HARGINS (BURST/LCF)
J
- MAINTAIN VERY HIGH RELIABILITY
- EXTENDED LIFE REQUIRENENTS
- COMPLETE KNI_LEDGE OF OPERATING STRESS
AND ENVIRONMENT
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GE ROTOR MATERIAL INTEGRITY PERSPECTIVE
IN MOREDETAIL
HATERIAL DEFECT EXPERIENCE
I. LOH NUMBEROF "MATERIAL DEFECT#
RELATEDCKACKSIN COMMERCIAL
ENGINE ROTOREXPERIENCE
COMMERCIALENGINE ROTOREXPERIENCE (1962-1975)
MATERIAL DEFECT RELATED FLAWS
GE - FLAWS FOUND IN FIELD ROTORS
INITIAL FLAWSIZE
l ROTORFLAWS 20 0,25 - 2.5 INCHES
. a • UNCONTAINEDINCIDENTS 1 0.25 - 0.5 INCHES
TOTAL INDUSTRy - SAE AD HOC COMMITTEE(SATTAR)
• 1_7 UNCONTAINEDDISK INCIDENTS
- 19 (lqZ) HATERIALOeFEC'rRELATED
• 58 OF THESE WERESEVERITYCATEGORYIll AND IV
- 10 (26Z) MATERIALDEFECTRELATED
w qr., . , • r _ _m_ i b
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NDE EXPERIENCE
a
If. NDE IS A GOOD PROCESSCONTROL TOOL,
BUT IS NOT AN ADEQUATE FINAL SCREEN.
r
NDE DETECTION CAPABILITY
• 90_ PROBABILITY
.
SEMI,CIRCU._AR CRACK LENGTH (MILe)
50_CONFIDENCE 95Z CONF]DENCE
SYSTEM ..__,__.r;__ CRACK SIZE :
4
/ FP| q0 65 ,l _ •
4
EDDY CURRENT 10 25 '
• UL'iRASON|CS
9
- NEAR SURFACE (l/q') 25 50
- BULK(2"1 60 120 "
_2
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N,9.E._eJLOBJ..EB_
(ULTRASONIC INSPECTION)
[._UJ.PJ_- PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT PUSHED BEYOND LIMITS AT
HIGH SENSITIVITY
DISKS - SURFACE FINISH/HICROSTRUCTUflE PREVENTED HIGH SENSITI-
ViTY INSPECTION
OPERATOR- MOST SYSTEMS MANUAL OPERATION, I,Eo MANUAL SIGNAL
RECOGNITION/EVALUATION
I_ - (OPERATCg/EQUIPMENT/PART) REOUIRED TO OPERATE BEYOND
LIMITS
TYPICAL_E EXPERIENCE
ULTRASONIC INSPECTION
READINGS AS REPORTED BY OPERATOR
LOW SENSITIVITY HIGH SENSITIVITY
INSPECTION SOURCE AMP. Z • AMP. Z •
INITIAL SCAN PRODUCTION 20 85
/
REPEAT SCAN PRODUCTION ]0 80
O
NDT LAB PRODUCTION 8 35-55
NDT LAB ENGINEERING 10-_2 55-_0
80ZAMPLITUDE = SIDE OF 20 MIL DIAMETER HOLE
?
e DEFECT IN PREFERRED ORIENTATION FOR DETECTION
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: CROSS-SECTIONOF DISK SHOHING
LOCATIONOF FLAt/
_54
. I
' " _'" "" ' 978002125 3521
(90_ PROBABI=]TY/95_ CONFIDENCE)
PRODUCTION NEAR TERR GOAL LONG TERH GOAL
_LE_._TJ92L_O_E _
- FP! qO 25 "
EDDY CURRENT 10 5
ULTRASONICS 20 5
• HAJOR EFFORT AT GE TO IHPROVE ULTRASONICS
- TRANSDUCER
b
- PULSER/RECEIVER
- SIGNAL ANALYSIS
- COHPUTER AIDED CONTROL/EVALUATION _
7
GOAL: REHOVE OPERATOR JUDGEHENT FROH SYSTEH
#
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GE ROTOR f_T_IAL INTEGRITY PERSPECTIVE
RECAP
t
m
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I, _ INCREASE IN MATERIAL PROPERTIES PLUS INCREASE IN 1
LIFE DEIqANDS
; II, VERY LON INCIDENCE OF HATERIAL DEFECTS
Ill. flAINTAIN DESIGN MARGINS AND VERY HIGH RELIABILITY
•,,I ,e
,. •
• ME HAVE EXPERIENCED VERY FEtt HATERIALS RELATED DEFECT FAILURES,
• THE FACT iS ME ACHIEVE FAILURE PREVENTION BY flATERIALS
AND HANUFACTURING CONTROL .... JUST HAINTAIN IT,
"PREHIUH QUALITY e mTERIAL AND PROCESS SPECIFICATIONS
? - |
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p_.,._ GOAL
• HAINTAIN HIGH CONFIDENCE IN ESTABLISHED PROCESSES
e PREVENT HATERIAL DEFECTS
CONTROLPROCESS- PREVENT PEVIATION
AUDIT SYSTEM - ADEQUATECONTROL/CORRECTIVEACTION
AUDIT PROCESS- UNIFORM/CONSISTANT PRACTICE DRAWING
a
INSPECT PRODUCT- DRAHING CONFORHANCE
- NDE AS A PROCESS CONTROLTOOL
: MAJOR EMPHASIS: EARLY PROBLEMRECOGNITION
P.Q. MATERIAL SYSTEM
IN-DEPTH CONTROLFOR CRITICAL ROTA'fING PARTS
• TRACEABILITY - ALL RAN HATERIAL : t'
• DOUBLEOR TRIPLE VACUURMELTING
_, • CONTROLLEDMELTING AND CONVERSION
k
# _ • BILLET AND FORGINGMULTIPLE NDE
. • FORGING AND HEAT TREATMENT
I FINISHED PART NDE
- APPROVEDVENDORLIST/REPORT CARD
- VENDORAGREEMENT- PROCESSCHANGEAPPROVAL
- DONN6RN)E VENDOR'- POOR PERFORf_MCE
- -/ ,, ,. .. " .':,-",_".'_",;.:_-;,k- ," --_, ,__::".: i, , , ,.., • ,,,
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TITANIUM BASE ALLOY
FLUOROSCOPIC INSPECTION
' t A I ,9 ' ,SE ;S
I I ! i _ L INELTING MELTING SOURCE INGOT PRODU_[CRITICAL VARIABLES p _,
- I oa /iD
GE APPROVAL U
I 'C . _.
¥ U/S INSPECTION 1 _"
INGOT CONVERSION 1 NACROETCH
L
AUDIT D
s t
• _
•_ ,l TO FORGER
i
! , _*_'.. ,:
T :
t "_, 0 •
L •
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PREMIUM QUALITY TITANIUM ALLOY CONTROLS
0 MELT RAW MATERIAL/SOURCES
- T• SPONGE
- MASTER ALLOY
- REVERT ALLOY
M - TI DIOXIDE
- COMPACT WELDING
I
I MELT FURNACE CLEANLINESS
L
• MELT INTERRUPTIONS/PRELIMINARY AND FINAb CYCLES
L l VACUUM/WATER LEAK_
• REMELT ELECTRODE SLRFACE CLEANLINESS
@ INGOT CONVERSION PRACTICE
• BILLET ACCEPTANCEPLAN
- ULTRASONIC INSPECTION PLAN
- I_CROETCH BAR ENDS
- FORGE-DOWNPROPERTIES
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/PREMIUM QUALITY TITANIUM ALLOY CONTROLS
0 FORGING MULTIPLEMACROETCH
•" 0 FORGINGPROCESS
- PRE-HEAT
F
- UPSETRATIO
- HEATTREATMENT
0
- MICROSTRUCTURE
- MACROETCH
R
0 MECHANICALPROPERTIES
G - TENSILE
- FRACTURETOUGHNESS
E - LOWCYCLEFATIGUE
0 PROCESSDOCUMENTATION
R
0 TOTAL MATERIAL/PROCESSCONTROL ,,"_
" TRACEABILITY
- ACCOUNTABILITY
TYPICAL TITANIUM MELTINGPRACTICE
(SIMILAR PRACTICEFOR IRON AND t'NICKEL BAS ALLOYS)
%
TRIPLE VACUUMMELTED
| WELDEDCOMPACTS MELTEDTO 2q" DIAMETERELECTRODE
| 2q" DIAMETERELECTRODE MELTEDTO 30" DIAMETE_ELECTRODE
| 30" DIAMETERELECTRODE MELTEDTO 36" INGOTf
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A HORROR STORY
INCIDENT=
l STAGE 3-9 TX-6-2-4-2 SPOOL
- HARD ALPHA ZONE PLUS OXIDE INCLUSIONS
RESULT= A LATENT MELT RELATED HIGH OXYGEN ZONE PASSED
THRCUGH THE SYSTEM UNDETECTED,
STAGE 3-9 SPOOL CONfOUR
,
CI':NTERLI_n.
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ENGINE INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
• PR[I,tARY CAUSE
TYPE [ OXYGENSTABILIZED HARD "ALPHAu
INCLUSION WIT:4 POROSITY
• FAILURE HECHANISH
CYCLIC CRACK PROPAGATIONFROMTHE INCLUSION
TO SPOOL SEPARATION
IB.Y.E.,_II.C,_T_
• HILL ON STRIKE
• POST STRIKE START-UP PROBLEMSIN INGOT CONVERSION
- HARD i..OHA INCLUSIONS
- CENTER BURST (POROSITY)
- LOW BILLET YIELDS (ULTRASONIC REJECTS)
- DELAYED SHIPHENTS
": • FORGERREQUESTEDTO CONVERT INGOTS - EXPEDITE DELIVERY
[ e AT HILL: OF TbIELVE INGOTS CONVERTEDAND INSPECTEDs
e
- 9 CONTAINED ULTRASONIC INDICATION
- 3 WENT TO FORGER- NO INDICATIONS IDENTIFIED BY
HIS ULTRASONIC INSPECTION
: - THE FAILED SPOOL CARE FROH ONE OF THESE THREE INGOTS
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INVESTIGATION CONCLU$1ON_:
• LOW PROCESS YIELDS NOT TRACKED BY MILL OR GE
• NO IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN
• PROCESS CHANGED AFTER STRIKE (?) START-UP PLAN (?)
• MATERIAL BYPASSED MILL ULTRASONIC INSPECTION -
FORGER PERFORMED (AN UNAPPROVED SOURCE FOR THIS
OPERATION)
i
LESSON LEARNED
!
l
VIOLATE A P,Q, CONTROLLED PROCESS,,, T
AND RISK AN INCIDENT OF SIGNIFICANT
"_. / PROPORTIONS.
4,
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PREMIUMQUALITYPIATER|ALTRACKRECORD
(1972THROUGH1976)
- POUNDS OF ALLOY
T[TAN[UR BASE
TOTAL PO BILLET PRODUCED 10,000,000 10,000,000
HEATS REJECTED AT MELTER 20,000 20,000
BILLET REJECTS AT RILL/FORGER 150,000 150,000
TOTAL PO PARTS PRODUCED 7,000 16,000
FORGING/ROTOR REJECTS 5 75
GE EXPERIENCE: ONLY ONE SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT
• NONEHHEN PO ROUTINE RIGOROUSLY FOLLONED.
RATERIAL PROCESS CONTROL IS THE MOST IMPORTANT KEY
ELEMENT FOR PREVENTION OF MATERIAL DEFECT RELATED
i'
/
J ROTOR FAILURES.
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DISCUSSION
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
I have one question. Who enforces this procedure -- General Electric,
, or people that you have at the mill?
R. Duttweiler, GE-Cincinnati
It is all of them -- steel supplier people and our quality engineering
as well as resident people who visit and audit the mills. Every six months
we do an audit and every year we renew our agreement as to how things will
be processed.
A lot of enforcement is done by the vendor himself; he writes down the
rules that he will live by, and we simply audit against them. If he merely
depends on us to catch him, he is not doing his job. He is failing to do /
what we both need to assure premium quality. We have simply set up a self-
policing system.
One thing I'd like to add is that this system was forced by engineering /"
on the manufacturer, with great reluctance because manufacturing told us that
this would be an extremely expensive way to go. It really hasn't proved to be
the case. It has developed into an accepted discipline. At first it was
expected that these requirements would add an additional 8-10 per cent to raw
materials cost, but it has not amounted to anything near that figure in recent !
years.
.
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